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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal by the State of Utah from an 
Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, presiding,t 
granting the defendant-respondent's Motion to Suppress certain items 
of evidence seized by Utah Highway Patrol Troopers from the 
defendant-respondent's motor vehicle, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon Motion of the defendant-respondent, the District Court 
granted a Motion to Suppress evidence seized from the motor vehicle 
being driven by the defendant-respondent and in his possession at the 
time of his arrest. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondst requests that the decision of the trial 
court be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-respondent adopts the statement of facts set forth 
in the Appellant's Brief and makes these additions: 
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At the time of the defendant-respondent's arrest and the 
incidents involved directly to that arrest, all of which occurred on 
U.S. Highway 91 south of Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah, the 
investigating officer, Trooper Paul V. Mangelson of the Utah Highwayt 
Patrol, became suspicious that the vehicle being driven by the 
defendant-respondent was carrying and being used to transport 
marijuana. Trooper Mangelson testified that, in his 17 years1 
experience as a Highway Patrolman (during which time he has received 
commendation for being a "Police Officer of the Year" on several 
occasions) , he has become experienced in identifying persons and 
vehicles involved in the transporting of controlled substances and 
that, in this particular case, those circumstances were present and 
raised his suspicions. (T 23) Those circumstances were: 
A. That the defendant-respondent had flown from Utah to 
Arizona; where**ie had rented a vehicle for the pur-
pose of driving back to Utah; 
B. That the defendant-respondent appeared to be under 
the influence of a controlled substance; 
C. That the defendant-respondent was using a rented 
car; 
D. There was an extremely strong odor of marijuana 
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about the vehicle, but no substantial quantity of 
marijuana could be found within the passenger com-
partment; 
E. There were strong air fresheners located in the 
passenger compartment of the car; 
F. The defendant-respondent refused the officer volun-
tary entrance into the trunk of the vehicle; 
G. The defendant-respondent was carrying a loaded fire-
arm; and 
H. The general demeanor of the defendant-respondent. 
With those factors in mind, the motor vehicle was taken under 
police supervision and control to the yard surrounding the Juab County 
Public Safety Building. (T 25) The officers determined to conduct an 
investigatory search of the vehicle; with Trooper Mangelson asking his 
supervisor, Sargeant Christensen, if they should secure a Search 
Warrant, (T 26) Clearly ite was in the officer's mind, at this point, 
that they were in an investigatory stage of a matter involving the 
transportation and possession of marijuana and, for this reason, they 
inquired of each other regarding the securing of a Search Warrant. (T 
27) Sargeant Christensen replied that they should attempt to get a 
consent to the search. The defendant-respondent who was in jail on 
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charges of 1) possession of a loaded and concealed firearm; 2) 
possession of a controlled substance; and 3) possession of vehicle 
without registration, and unable to post bail, was approached and he 
refused to give consent to the search. Some inquiry was made to get a 
Search Warrant. The officers were unable to locate the County Attorney 
and they were unable to locate one of the two Justice's of the Peace 
in Nephi, Utah and they, therefore, determined that they would use an 
impound inventory as a devise to conduct an investigatory search of 
the trunk of the vehicle. (T 26) 
It should be noted that Nephi, Utah is located within the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Utah, serviced by four (4) District 
Judges, within the Eighth Circuit Court District serviced by five (5) 
Circuit Judges, that there are three (3) Precinct Justices within Juab 
County, and two (2) Court Executives. 
The officers had the keys to the vehicle in their possession and 
the trunk vehicle was opened. The contents were seized and the matter 
is now before the Court for review. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM 
THE TRUNK OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHICH WAS SEIZED WITHOUT A 
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SEARCH WARRANT DURING AN IMPOUND INVENTORY WHEN THE IMPOUND 
INVENTORY WAS USED AS A SUBTERFUGE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGA-
TORY SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE; THE SEARCH NOT BEING MADE 
INCIDENT TO ARREST, THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND 
THE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO SECURE A SEARCH WARRANT. 
Again the Court is asked to balance the rights of the people to 
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, a complement of 
freedom, as provided by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah, with the right of the people to a well ordered society through 
exercise of the police power, also a complement of freedom. 
One principle consistent with the extensive consideration of this 
subject seems to be that each case must be considered upon its own 
facts. Nevertheless the Utah Supreme Court has adopted useful 
guidelines which give direction and are dispositive of this case. Five 
Utah cases are cited for this purpose: 
First, State v^ Criscola, 444 P.2d 517, (1968). In this case, 
evidence was seized during^an impound inventory of an automobile; 
which had been stopped when the defendant was arrested on a traffic 
violation. The defendant did not own the car and he had no valid 
drivers license. The defendant was taken into custody, and the car 
impounded. In sustaining the trial court's ruling of admissibility of 
such evidence, the Court made the following comment: 
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"Inasmuch as he (the defendant) could not lawfully drive 
the automobile and was placed under arrest, it was necessary 
that the car be taken into possession and impounded. When 
the officers thus became responsible for the car and its 
contents, it was in conformity with ordinary prudence and 
customary practice, for the protection of the car owner as 
well as the police, for the officers to take an inventory of 
its contents. This of course necessarily involves discovery 
of what the contents were. To suggest that under those cir-
cumstances where the police had thus come into the posses-
sion of personal property which they had reason to believe 
was connected with a felony, they would have to go and ob-
tain a warrant to conduct a "search" and "find" that which 
they already had lawful possession of seems completely dis-
cordant with reason." 
Second, State v^ Shields, 503 P.2d 848 (1972). This case also 
involves the search of an automobile. This time, incident to arrest 
for the crimes charged, with descriptions of the subjects to be 
arrested: 
"In exigent circumstances, the judgment of a police offi-
cer as to probable cause will serve as sufficient authoriza-
tion for a search, i.e., a search warrant is unnecessary 
where there is probable cause to search an automobile 
stopped on the highway for the car is movable, the occu-
pants are allerted, and the car's contents may never be 
found again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence, an immed-
iate search is constitutionally permissible." 
Third, State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (1978). Again, search of an 
automobile incident to arrest. Arrest being made based upon eyewitness 
identification of the defendant's car as bearing the same license as 
the car seen leaving the scene of a theft: 
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"Here as is constitutionally required there was 
probable cause for a search, and also sufficient exigent 
circumstances for immediately searching without a warrant. 
Why? A man was seen wheeling two tires down a street; a 
description and license number of the car driven by that man 
was obtained; the cable holding the wheels and tires had 
been cut; that car and license number at the defendant's 
house matched the description given to Officer Curl; and the 
officer observed bolt cutters on the front seat of defend-
ant's car. We hold that these factors constituted probable 
cause. 
"Also the car in this case was stopped on a side road, the 
defendant was alerted to the "peril" of his situation, and 
without the search and seizure, the contents of the car may 
never have been found again indeed, probably would not 
had the officers left to obtain a search warrant. Hence, 
we hold the requirement of exigent circumstances obtained in 
this matter." 
Fourth, State v. Crabtree, 618 P.2d 484 (1980) is concerned with 
an inventory made of the contents of a suitcase taken from an 
automobile the defendant was driving when arrested on a traffic 
violation, and a fugitive warrant. The defendant told officers that 
the suitcase contained a firearm and a large quantity of money. The 
inventory was not conducted in the hope of uncovering evidence, but 
merely caretaking procedure, and the Court went on to say: 
"The purpose of the procedure, in the officer's words, was 
'to make sure that I had every item Mr. Crabtree had of his 
belongings listed as being in my possession now so that I 
could return all of it to him to both his and my satisfac-
tion.' 
"We hold that the police procedure followed in this case 
falls within the inventory search exception to the search 
warrant requirement. 
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"An inventory examination of the contents of an automobile 
impounded by the police was a procedure justified by the 
need to protect private property whiLe in police custody, by 
need to protect the police against claims of stolen property, 
and the need to protect the police or others from potential 
danger . . . . 
"No suggestion was made that the inventory was a subter-
fuge for investigation." 
Fifth, State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699 (1981) involves evidence 
obtained during an impound inventory. Defendant was arrested on an 
unrelated charge. Defendant was driving a pickup truck at the time of 
the arrest. The truck did not belong to the defendant and he claimed 
no proprietory nor possessory interest. Neither the truck owner nor 
his named agent could be located. The truck was, therefore, impounded 
and an inventory of its contents made. The Court said: 
"The law is well established that warrantless searches of 
impounded vehicles for the benign purpose of protecting the 
police and the public from danger, avoiding police liabil-
ity for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's 
property, are permitted by the Fourth Amendment." 
Applying the principles cited in these Utah cases can only lead 
to the conclusion that, in the case now before the Court, the evidence 
seized during the impound inventory was properly suppressed by the 
Court. The primary reason being that the officers were conducting an 
investigative search. There were no "benign" purposes motivating the 
officers. 
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Admitted, there was a probable cause to conduct the search, but 
that probable cause was the basis for obtaining a search warrant. 
There was no threat of loss of any evidence. No doubt the defendant 
was alerted to the situation, but the defendant had been unable to 
produce registration for the vehicle or any other proof of possessory 
right. The defendant had been arrested on at least three charges, had 
been booked, and placed into the Juab County Jail as an inmate. He had 
no funds with which to secure a bail bond or post bail. His family was 
unwilling to post bail. Indeed, he was incarcerated with no hope of 
early release at the time of the search. 
No owner of the vehicle was present demanding possession. The 
officers had possession and control of the vehicle. They knew their 
situation and considered acceptable methods of search, i.e., entry and 
search by permission or the use of a search warrant. Being denied 
permission, they sought the easy way out. They conducted an 
investigative search and called it an impound inventory. 
When officers know the proper procedure, and it is available to 
them, there is no excuse to depart from acceptable standards of 
conduct, to accommodate the personal convenience of the officer. This 
places the public in unacceptable jeopardy. 
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In considering the facts, viewing the officers1 testimony at the 
suppression hearing, the trial court determined that the officers had 
acted improperly and that the evidence seized had been obtained 
illegally. There is no showing that this ruling is clearly in error. 
State v^ Criscola, supra, this court said: 
"Due to the responsibility of the trial court in control-
ling the admissibility of evidence, and his advantaged posi-
tion to pass on such matters, it is his prerogative to make 
this determination. For those reasons his ruling should be 
indulged with a presumption of correctness, and should not 
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in error." 
There are two additional considerations raised by the appellant 
which require comment. First is the recent ruling of the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Leon, 82 L.Ed. 2d 677 
(1984). That case has limited application to the matter now before the 
court. At issue was admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to 
warrant. All court rulings being that the police officers had acted 
properly in discharging their duties and the directive of the warrant. 
Reviewing courts held that the Judge issuing the warrant had acted 
without a proper showing of probable cause, however, noting that it 
was a close question. The court found the evidence admissible and did 
not apply the exclusionary rule, explaining that the exclusionary rule 
was intended to deter police officers from acting improperly. Since 
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the officers had correctly complied with the search warrant directive, 
acted in good faith, the reasoning behind the exclusionary rule did 
not apply. The application of that ruling to the instant case is that 
the reason for the exclusionary rule is pervasively present. The 
officers acted improperly and such conduct needs to be condemned. 
Finally is brief consideration of the recently enacted provisions 
of Section 78-16-5 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. This section is suggested 
by the appellant as limiting the scope of the Constitutional 
provisions cited above. If it is to be so interpreted, then the code 
section must fail as being unconstitutional; the only way is if it be 
read as surplusage to the Constitution and is merely a restatement of 
case law definition of the Constitution. At any rate, it is of little 
value in giving proper guidance to police officers, and protecting the 
constitutional rights of society, when considered in the historical 
dynamics of application of the constitutional provisions of the needs 
and goals of our society. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court has carefully considered the question of 
excluding evidence. Exclusion of existing facts and articles in 
existence is no easy matter for court determination. But it has been 
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found as an acceptable method of balancing the constitutional rights 
of the people, with the activities of our police authorities. Here, 
there was a clear abuse of the police power in violation of the 
constitutional provision and the trial court correctly suppressed the 
evidence and that ruling should be sustained by tins Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTOJ^T. HARMON 
Attorney for Respondent 
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